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1. Introduction  
Primary goal of company establishment is to 
achieve a maximum profit and thus to improve the 
welfare of its owners or shareholders (Rochmah & 
Ardianto, 2020). Shareholder welfare can be 
improved through company value (Setiawan, 
Bandi, Kee Phua, & Trinugroho, 2016; Tahu & 
Susilo, 2017). Company value is defined as the 
company's market price value because it can 
provide investors or shareholders prosperity if the 
share price increases (Triani & Tarmidi, 2019). If 
the company has a high value, investors will be 
attracted to invest in the company (Setyawan & 
Devie, 2017). Endri and Fathony (2020) believe 
that company value results from the company's 
performance in one period. The better the 
company's performance, the more likely potential 
investors will invest. In other words, the firm value 
will shape investors' perceptions of the company's 
success rate, which is reflected in the stock price.  
Firm value is also part of the achievement of 
relatively consistent company performance. This 
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consistent performance achievement is the work of 
the entire board of directors or management in the 
company. In this context, a chief executive officer 
(CEO) as the main director has a dominant role in a 
company decision making process. Thus, CEO 
performance can contribute to the improvement of 
company value (Setyawan & Devie, 2017). 
CEO in Indonesia is an executive officer who 
has the highest position in a company. CEO is fully 
responsible on the company performance. The 
CEO may intervene the company business as the 
CEO decision has implication on the company's 
strategy and policies (Kassim, Ishak, & Manaf, 
2013; Saidu, 2019; Wei, 2019). Sheikh (2018) 
found evidence that there is a strong relationship 
between CEO and company performance. For 
instance, the role of Steve Jobs as CEO of Apple 
Inc. was to make the company to be the 
international leader in technology industry. Apple 
Inc. became known to the public because it has 
good corporate values. Apple Inc. also succeeded 
in becoming a pioneer in technological 
developments in the world.  
Apart from Apple Inc, a problem recently 
occurred with the CEO of a large airline company 
in Indonesia, namely PT Garuda Indonesia. The 
CEO was convicted for smuggling big Harley 
motorbikes and Brompton bikes 1 . PT. Garuda 
Indonesia was in the spotlight, which also impacts 
the company's value. Garuda's shares have begun 
to enter the red zone at the beginning of 2020. 
Garuda's share price moved from Rp 498 at the end 
of the year to a low of Rp 496 per share. Besides, 
the international rank of Garuda has declined. The 
Skytrax dropped Garuda to second place for the 
World Best Cabin category. This might confirm 
that not all CEOs is able to increase company value; 
some make company values worse because of their 
actions. The CEO's actions can have a lot to do with 
the company's value. So, the CEO is expected to 
have an excellent reputation for reflecting good 




The CEO is responsible for setting company 
goals, making strategies, monitoring, and making 
decisions that impact the company's running (Daft, 
2008).  
A CEO also has the authority to inspire those 
around him to achieve the vision and missions 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). According to the 
upper echelons theory, the CEO's strategy describes 
the cognitive values of a CEO because the CEO has 
a vital role in making decisions that are considered 
effective. The theory also proves that CEO 
characteristics have a relationship with company 
performance. The CEO's role in the company is 
significant, one of which is to make decisions that 
the company will execute. With the right decisions, 
the company can operate well. A CEO must know 
what strategies should be used so that the company 
can achieve the vision that has been previously set, 
both short and long term visions. A vision is a series 
of goals of a company that want to be realized in 
the future (Wibisono, 2006). 
One of the most important visions in the 
company is to support the company. Certo, 
Holmes, and Holcomb (2007) argue that the CEO 
has the power to impact the investment decisions of 
investors who have high potential. With his 
strengths, the CEO can have an impact on 
employees with the decisions that have been made. 
Saidu (2019) believe that groups that have 
companies have a hypothesis that, when managers 
lead a company, there is a tendency that managers 
will work to achieve the targets set by the company.  
According to Lasswell, Kaplan, and Brunner 
(2017), power is a relationship between people or 
groups that can influence the actions of other 
people or groups according to the wishes of the first 
party. The power or power possessed by the CEO 
can come from reputation (prestige power), shares 
he owns (power held), experience (expert power), 
formal position (structural power) and other non-
financial information that investors also consider to 
assess the company's future prospects. CEO power 
17 




can be defined as the power of the CEO in 
overcoming obstacles to achieve the desired results 
(Wei, 2019). 
Apart from the strength of the CEO, the CEO 
can also take advantage of several factors, such as 
experience, expertise, skills, and knowledge. in 
making decisions for the company (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). The experience here can be seen 
from a CEO in a company. CEOs who have greater 
powers can increase expertise related to the 
corporate sector so that companies can compete in 
their fields (Li & Patel, 2019). 
Li, Li, and Minor (2016) also agree with this; 
the CEO who has led the company for a long time 
has broader knowledge in his work environment. 
Besides that, CEOs who have experience from 
various companies and different industries can also 
make decisions that benefit the company (Li & 
Patel, 2019). 
Certo (2003) also argues that the board of 
directors describes non-financial information. Such 
as experience, abilities and social connections. That 
is important for investors to make the right 
investment decisions. This study will use data from 
non-financial companies for the 2014-2018 period 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
Researchers used the 2014-2018 period because, in 
that year, there was something provided by the 
Indonesian government for foreign investors who 
wanted to invest. This was fulfilled with investor 
investment during 2014-2018 based on data from 
the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board 
(BKPM RI)2. The information generated from this 
period is the latest information which is expected to 
present this research in accordance with the current 
state of the company with data from the latest 
reports. 
Dowell, Shackell, and Stuart (2011) showed 
that CEO strength has a positive relationship with 
firm value. Sheikh (2018) also shows that the 
greater the power the CEO has, the greater the value 




(2016) examined the effect of CEO Power on 
company performance. The results show that CEO 
power shows a positive relationship with company 
performance. This is because the CEO has the 
power to reduce conflict and solve problems so that 
he can make decisions more quickly and 
effectively. Wu, Quan, and Xu (2011) state that 
taking decisions that are concentrated by the CEO 
will result in high performance, thus showing good 
performance variability in the company. In 
contrast,  Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) 
stated that CEO power has a negative relationship 
with firm value. Research conducted by Wei (2019) 
states that CEO power has a positive and negative 
relationship to company performance.  
The existence of inconsistencies in research 
results, and in Indonesia itself, creates a research 
gap in this study, so it will be interesting to examine 
the relationship between CEO power and company 
value in Indonesia. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the relationship between the power of the 
company's president director as proxied by 
ownership power, expert power and prestige power 
with firm value. This study uses a quantitative 
approach. The independent variable of this study is 
the power of the CEO (CEO power) and the 
dependent variable is the value of the company.  
This study uses secondary data sources from 
the annual reports of non-financial companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014-2018, 
with a total sample of 322 research samples. This 
study contributes in providing information 
regarding the relationship between CEO power and 
firm value as well as consideration for investors to 
invest in companies that can generate maximum 
returns from the management side, namely CEO 
power consisting of ownership power, expert 
power, prestige power and company value because 
in the results of this study are the strength of the 
CEO has a positive relationship with firm value. 
The paper structures are as follows: Section 2 
describes the theoretical basis and hypothesis 
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development, Section 3 describes the research 
approach, data sources, sample selection, variables 
and technical analysis used, Section 4 contains the 
results of the analysis and discussion of research 
results, and in Section 5 contains the contents of the 
research, limitations and suggestions. 
2. Theoretical framework 
Agency theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest an agency 
relationship that becomes a contract between the 
owner of the capital as principal and the director as 
the agent. The contract in question is a detailed 
explanation of what the director must do to manage 
the funds that investors have provided as well as a 
balanced distribution of returns so that the contract 
can be assessed as good. The director here has an 
obligation to be accountable for what investors 
have entrusted to him (Arifin, 2005). Agency 
theory illustrates that strong CEOs use their 
strengths to fulfil desired goals which in most cases 
are inconsistent with shareholders (Tien, Chen, & 
Chuang, 2013). Based on this theory, experts 
suggest that a company can manage its assets so 
that it can minimize unnecessary expenses and 
maximize profits. If the company pays attention to 
the interests of shareholders so that the company 
can provide maximum profit as expected by 
stakeholders. 
Upper echelons theory 
Upper echelons theory is a theory developed 
by Hambrick and Mason (1984) which states that 
organizational outcomes such as strategic choices 
can be predicted from a managerial background. 
This means that this theory can predict the future of 
an organization through its manager organization. 
This theory also views that top managers can 
produce organizational results. The results of a 
good and effective strategy can be seen as a 
reflection of the values and cognitive bases that 
have a relationship with the organization 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Top managers are the 
main decision-makers in an organization, so the 
decisions taken have a large and direct impact on 
the organization. As decision-makers, top 
managers have responsibility for the organization’s 
organization. 
Overall, executives' roles and characteristics 
will be particularly related to organizational 
outcomes because they have responsibility for 
the organization  (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
This theory suggests that the organization deals 
with top executives. Their experiences, values, 
and personalities have an impact, especially in 
dealing with situations that will relate to the 
choices or decisions they will choose. The theory 
also holds that the executives (top executives) 
greatly determine their choice of strategy 
(strategic choice), which ultimately determines 
its performance. 
 
Relationship between ownership power and 
firm value 
In some companies, there is a main director 
(CEO) who owns shares in the company he leads. 
The shares he owns are a form of power that is often 
referred to as ownership power (Han, Nanda, & 
Silveri, 2016). The greater the share ownership of a 
company led by the CEO, the greater the CEO 
power (Han et al., 2016). The many challenges 
faced indicate that only CEOs who have the power 
can easily turn strategy into action, manage 
processes efficiently, and increase profits to create 
long-term companies and increase company value 
(Ulrich, 1998). Ownership power is a formal form 
of power that can directly impact the CEO's 
decision-making process. In this case, the strength 
of the CEO can be shown by how much impact the 
decisions he makes for the organization. 
If the CEO owns shares in the company, then 
the interests of the CEO will be the same as other 
owners of capital. The greater the number of shares 
the CEO has in the company, the more power the 
CEO has in the company he leads. So that in this 
case, the CEO will try to make decisions that can 
increase company value and increase the wealth of 
shareholders, including himself.  
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Based on the description above, the hypothesis 
in this study can be proposed as follows. 
H1: Ownership power is positively related to firm 
value 
 
Relationship between expert power and firm 
value 
Expert power is the CEO's power, which is 
based on knowledge and experience in relevant 
fields and in accordance with the company to gain 
access related to company information. This 
knowledge and experience is the source of strength 
for the CEO to gain trust so that he has the 
confidence to get advice from the CEO (Sudana & 
Aristina, 2017).  
CEOs who have more experience can assist 
companies in obtaining and providing information. 
(Han et al., 2016). stated that the longer the CEO's 
tenure, the more knowledge the CEO has. The 
longer the CEO has been able to signal that they 
have a high level of professionalism and expertise 
that can influence the decisions he makes. CEOs 
who have experience are better able to increase 
company value because they can make more 
effective decisions. The CEO's own experience can 
be seen from his presence in a company. The longer 
the new CEO, the greater the experience he has, the 
greater his power to make decisions that can 
increase company value. Based on the description 
above, the hypothesis in this study can be stated as 
follows. 
H2: Expert power is positively related to firm value 
 
Relationship between prestige power and firm 
value 
Prestige power is the CEO's strength which can 
be seen from the positive perceptions that the CEO 
has (Wu et al., 2011). A good reputation can be 
obtained from an educational background and 
relationships with external parties such as the 
government, politics and other influential people. 
The CEO has a connection that allows them to gain 
access to information that is beneficial in decision 
making for the company (Pennings, 1980). 
CEOs who have a good educational 
background are qualified in managing companies 
(D’Aveni & Kesner, 1993). By having a good 
reputation, the CEO will not trust employees and 
related outsiders. With this belief, decision-making 
will be easier to make. The reputation that the CEO 
can see from the awards he gets for being CEO. The 
more awards the CEO gets, the better the reputation 
he gets and the easier the decision-making process 
to increase company value. Based on the 
description above, the hypothesis in this study can 
be stated as follows. 
H3: Prestige power is positively related to firm 
value 
 
3. Research method 
Types and sources of data 
This research uses quantitative types and data 
in the form of secondary data and time-series data 
from 2014-2018. Sources of data are the annual 
reports of all non-financial companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2014-2018 
period, which are obtained from the official 
website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange and the 
company's website. 
 
Population and sample 
The population of this study is non-financial 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
during the 2014-2018 period. The data source used 
is secondary data in the form of annual reports and 
financial reports of all financial sectors listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2014-2018 
period except for sector-8 companies, namely 
financial sector companies, because they have 
different financial reporting criteria and standards 
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
Information 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
Population: 
The number of companies listed on the IDX in 2014-2018 
425 439 449 483 530 2326 
Disqualified: 
- Non-financial companies that did not publish 
financial reports in 2014-2018 
- There is no share ownership by the CEO 
- Non-financial companies that did not report 
financial statements ended December 31st 
(362) (368) (387) (389) (498) (2004) 
Total Observations 63 71 62 94 32 322 
 
 The sample used in this study was selected by 
purposive sampling method by selecting samples 
that meet certain criteria in accordance with the 
research objectives. Based on data found on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), the total of all 
non-financial companies listed as of December 31 
2018, is 530 companies, so there are 2,326 research 
population, but based on the sample selection 
criteria, namely non-financial companies listed on 
the IDX and not delisted for the 2014-2018 period, 
companies that have CEO shares owned by that 
time and the information required regarding data 
relating to the complete variable obtained a total 
sample of 322 observations from 530 companies. 
Operational definition 
 We use control variables to explain the 
phenomenon optimally because other variables can 
also influence the dependent variable. The control 
variables in this study are company size, leverage 
and ROA. We chose this variable because previous 
research has been shown to have a significant effect 
on firm value (Adiputra & Hermawan, 2020; Tien 
et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2011). We use control 
variables to explain the phenomenon optimally 
because other variables can also influence the 
dependent variable. Each of these variables will be 
described in Table 1 below:
 
Table 2. Operational definition 
Variable Definition Measurement Sources of Data 
Dependent Variable 
F Value Nilai Perusahaan Tobin’s Q (Han et al., 2016; Sheikh, 
2018) 
Annual Reports and Financial 
Reports 
Independent Variable 
Own  Ownership Power Percentage of CEO shares in the 
company (Han et al., 2016) 
Annual Reports and Financial 
Reports 
Ten Expert Power The number of years the CEO has 
served at the company (Han et al., 2016; 
Sheikh, 2018)  
Annual Reports 
Pres Prestige Power Dummy variable, given a value of 1 if 
the CEO received an award during his 
tenure; otherwise, it will be given a 
value of 0 (Wu et al., 2011) 
Annual Reports 
Control Variable 
FIRMSIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets (Han et 
al., 2016; Rochmah & Ardianto, 2020; 
Utami & Inanga, 2011) 
Annual Reports and Financial 
Reports 
LEV Leverage Total debt divided by total assets (Han 
et al., 2016; Rochmah & Ardianto, 
2020; Utami & Inanga, 2011) 
Annual Reports and Financial 
Reports 
ROA Returns on Asset 
(ROA) 
Net income divided by total assets (Han 
et al., 2016; Rochmah & Ardianto, 
2020; Utami & Inanga, 2011) 
Annual Reports and Financial 
Reports 
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Data analysis technique 
 The data analysis technique in this study used 
statistical calculations with the help of STATA 14. 
The test was carried out with descriptive statistical 
analysis, Pearson correlation test, and multiple 
linear analysis test. A multiple linear analysis test is 
a test conducted to determine the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables. 
The regression model for this study is as follows: 
 
Fvalueit    =   α + β1OWNi,t + β2TENi,t + β3PRESi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5LEVi,t + β6SIZEi,t + εi,t 
 
4. Results and discussion 
Statistical descriptive variables 
The firm value, which is proxied by using 
Tobin’s Q, shows that the firm value in this study 
has an average of 0.93, a standard deviation of 0.86, 
which indicates that the data are well spread. The 
highest company value is 4.81, and the lowest 
company value is 0.01. CEO power in this study is 
proxied by three measurements, namely ownership 
power, expert power and prestige power. 
Ownership power which is proxied by ownership, 
has an average of 0.04, a standard deviation of 0.10. 
The highest value is 0.95, and the lowest value is 
0.00, which indicates that there are still CEOs who 
do not have power through share ownership in the 
company where they work. Expert power, which is 
proxied by tenure, has an average of 12.61, which 
explains that the average length of time as a CEO 
in the study sample is 12 years and a standard 
deviation of 10.69. The maximum value is 48, and 
the minimum value is 1. Prestige power is proxied 
by the interlock, which is measured by a dummy; if 
the CEO gets an award during his tenure will be 
given a value of 1 and, if not given 0. The total 
frequency is 322 with a frequency value of 1 of 131 
with a percentage of 40.7% and a frequency of 0 
values of 191 with a percentage of 59.3%; this 
shows that CEOs who received awards during their 
tenure were fewer than those who did not receive 
awards during their tenure. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive test results 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Tobin’s Q 322 0.01900 4.81318 0.9374953 0.86459621 
Ownership 322 0.00001 0.95570 0.0472796 0.10335933 
Tenure 322 1 48 12.61 10.679 
Prestige 322 0 1 0.41 0.492 
Firm Size 322 24.72953 33.47373 28.7594546 1.60888888 
LEV 322 0.03873 0.98948 0.4993035 0.20528745 
ROA 322 -0.39184 0.24558 0.0279020 0.07853341 
Profitability has a standard deviation of 0.07 
with an average of 0.02, a maximum value of 0.24, 
and a minimum value of -0.39. The standard 
deviation of leverage is 0.20, with an average of 
0.49. The highest leverage is 0.98, and the lowest is 
0.03. The company's size has a mean of 28.75 and 
a standard deviation of 1.60. In this study, the 
largest company size was 33.47, while the smallest 
value was 24.72. 
 
Table 4. Pearson correlation test 
 Tobin's Q Tenure Ownership Prestige Size Lev Roa 
Tobin's Q  1.0000       
        
Tenure  0.3390***  1.0000      
 (0.0000)       
Ownership  0.1259**  0.1392**  1.0000     
 (0.0239) (0.0124)      
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Prestige  0.3463***  0.3542***  0.0518  1.0000    
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3544)     
Size -0.0332 -0.1853*** -0.1927***  0.1165**  1.0000   
 (0.5524) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0367)    
Lev -0.2272*** -0.0722 -0.0717** -0.1138**  0.3144***  1.0000  
 (0.0000) (0.1960) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0000)   
ROA  0.3222***  0.1526*** -0.1175** 0.1996***  0.0654 -0.3058*** 1.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0061) (0.0351) (0.0003) (0.2419) (0.0000)  
p-value in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
The Pearson correlation test is a test to measure the 
relationship between two random variables (Booth 
& Zhou, 2017). From the results of the Pearson test, 
it can be seen that expert power (tenure) and 
prestige power (prestige) have a positive 
relationship with firm value (Tobin's Q) at a 
significance level of 1%, while for ownership 
power (ownership) and firm value (Tobin's Q) there 
is a positive relationship at the 5% significance 
level. 
 
Multiple linear regression results 
 This test is carried out to assess whether or not 
there is a functional relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. As shown in 
Table 2 shows the results of the regression model. 
From this table, it can be seen that ownership power 
and firm value indicate a relationship. This is 
evidenced by the p-value of 0.004, which is smaller 
than the significance level of 0.01. Thus, the HI can 
be accepted. 
 Table 2 also shows the relationship between 
expert power and firm value is existed as a positive 
relationship between expectancy power (tenure) 
and firm value at a significance of 1% is approved. 
Thus, H1 is accepted, and H0 is rejected. Moreover, 
a relationship between prestige power and firm 
value is also found in this study. The Table 2 shows 
that prestige power also has a positive relationship 
with firm value at a significance of 1%.  
 For the control variable, ROA has a positive 
relationship with firm value for the regression 
model above at a significance level of 1%, while for 
the control variable leverage has a negative 
relationship with firm value for the above 
regression model at a significance level of 5% for 
ownership power, 1% for expert power and 10% for 
prestige power. The control variable firm size has 
no relationship with the firm value for the 
regression model above.
 
Table 5. Multiple linear regression analysis 
p-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable Firm Value 
Ownership    1.298***   
 (0.004)   
Tenure      0.0246***  
  (0.000)  
Prestige      0.515*** 
   (0.000) 
Roa    3.297***    2.476***    2.579*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lev  -0.548**   -0.650*** -0.450* 
 (0.026) (0.006) (0.060) 
Firmsize   0.00968  0.0306 -0.0264 
 (0.749) (0.298) (0.365) 
Constant 0.779   0.00280   1.640** 
 (0.354) (0.997) (0.041) 
Observations 322 322 322 
R-squared 0.145 0.209 0.203 
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Based on the research results, it is known that 
ownership power has a positive and significant 
positive relationship with firm value. This can be 
interpreted that the greater the ownership power of 
the president director or CEO in the company, the 
company value will also increase. This is evidenced 
by the ownership power value of 0.004 with a 
significance level of 0.01. Ownership power 
referred to here is the shares owned by the CEO in 
the company he holds. In stewardship theory, a high 
commitment to the company will make the CEO act 
as a steward (servant) to serve the interests of the 
company and create wealth and maximize the 
company's future opportunities for shareholders 
(Tien et al., 2013). 
 The share ownership he owns will make him 
have the same goal as the shareholders, namely the 
company's profit. The CEO will make decisions 
that are considered effective and efficient in order 
to create better corporate value so that the company 
can continue to run. The greater the share 
ownership the CEO has, the better the CEO will 
make decisions to increase company value so that 
shareholders will be more prosperous. This can be 
a positive signal to investors that the CEO can lead 
the company in a good direction. With this, the 
CEO has the ability to convince investors to invest 
in the company. A high stock value also reflects that 
the company has a high corporate value. This 
research is also in line with research conducted by 
Dowell et al. (2011) and Sheikh (2018), which 
states that CEO power has an influence on firm 
value. However, this result is not in line with the 
research of Chiu, Chen, Cheng, and Hung (2019), 
which explains that the positive results are not 
significant, where although strong CEOs tend to 
cause higher agency costs, they can create more 
benefits for the company by increasing 
organizational efficiency and resource utilization.  
 Expert Power has a positive and significant 
relationship to firm value so that H1 is accepted. 
Expert Power is the CEO's strength that we can see 
from the experience and knowledge the CEO has. 
CEOs who have more experience are considered to 
be able to assist companies in obtaining and 
providing information. The longer the CEO's 
position can be a signal that the level of 
professionalism and expertise of the CEO is getting 
greater and can increase his power in influencing 
the decisions he makes. CEOs who have more 
experience are considered to be able to increase 
company value. The longer the CEO is in office, the 
more experience he has, so the greater his power to 
make decisions that are considered to increase the 
value of the company. 
 Prestige power is positively related to firm 
value. Prestige power is the CEO's strength that 
comes from the positive perceptions he has because 
of his reputation. This reputation can come from an 
educational background and relations with external 
parties, as well as other parties, such as the 
government, politicians and other related people. 
By having a good reputation, the CEO will be 
trusted by employees and related external parties. 
With this belief, decision-making will be easier to 
make. The reputation that the CEO has can be seen 
from the awards he gets for being CEO. The more 
awards the CEO gets, the better the reputation he 
gets so that decision-making will be easier to 
increase firm value. 
 In this study, there are several control variables 
used, including leverage, ROA and firm size. Based 
on the multiple linear regression tests that have 
been carried out, the results show that ROA has a 
significant positive relationship with firm value. 
Leverage is negatively related to firm value. Firm 
size is not related to firm value. These results are in 
line with research from Li Ju and Shun Yu (2011), 
which also confirms a positive relationship between 
ROA and firm value and a negative relationship 
between leverage and firm value. Several other 
studies (Ibhagui & Olokoyo, 2018; Olokoyo, 2013). 
also found a significant relationship between 
leverage and firm value, where a higher level of 
leverage in the company's capital structure is 
associated with stronger firm value. On the other 
hand, the results of this study are not in line with 
research from Qiu, Shaukat, and Tharyan (2016) 
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and Hirdinis (2019), who found that firm size is 
positively related to firm value, which indicates that 
large company size will be able to attract investors 
to invest so that company value increases. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study aims to determine whether there is 
an influence between CEO power and firm value. 
Ownership power, which is proxied by share 
ownership, has a positive effect on firm value. This 
means that, in Indonesia, the CEO who owns shares 
in the company he leads is able to influence the 
value of the company. Expert power, which is 
proxied by CEO tenure, has a positive effect on 
company value. This means that the longer the CEO 
has served in a company, the CEO will have power 
because they have received information and the 
ability to lead a company. This information and 
ability are obtained from the experience of the 
CEO, who had led the company. The longer the 
CEO is in office, the more it will increase the 
company's value. Prestige power, as measured by 
the CEO's dummy, has a positive effect on firm 
value. This means that the CEO who gets an award 
as long as he leads the company will have a positive 
influence on the company so that it can increase 
company value. This can be explained because 
prestige power will make the CEO have high 
competence recognized by other parties so that the 
CEO can maximize firm value. 
 This study provide empirical evidence on the 
relationship between CEO power and company 
value as well as consideration for investors to invest 
in companies that can generate maximum returns 
from the management side, namely CEO power 
consisting of ownership power, expert power, 
prestige power and company value. The results of 
this study show CEO power is proven to have a 
positive relationship with firm value. 
 The limitation of this study is that the 
researcher only uses three measurements to 
measure CEO power using and does not use other 
measurements due to the limitations of sampling in 
Indonesia. The proxies used also have many 
shortcomings and do not describe all the variables 
assessed for the sample period of this study using 
only a five-year time span, namely 2014-2018. 
Researchers suggest using another measure in 
measuring CEO power in order to obtain 
comprehensive results about the effect of CEO 
power on firm value. 
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